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Evidence for anti-intellectualism about know-how from a sentence recognition task
Ian Harmon and Zachary Horne 
Abstract: An emerging trend in cognitive science is to explore central epistemological 
questions using psychological methods. Early work in this growing area of research has 
revealed that epistemologists’ theories of knowledge diverge in various ways from the 
ways in which ordinary people think of knowledge. Reflecting the practices of 
epistemology as a whole, the vast majority of these studies have focused on the concept 
of propositional knowledge, or knowledge-that. Many philosophers, however, have 
argued that knowing how to do something is importantly different from knowing that 
something is the case. Hence, in this paper we turn our attention to people’s concept of 
knowledge-how. We present data from two experiments that employed a sentence 
recognition task as an implicit measure of conceptual activation. The data from this 
implicit measure suggest that, contrary to prominent intellectualist theories of know-how, 
according to which know-how is a species of propositional knowledge, people’s concept 
of know-how more closely aligns with anti-intellectualism, the view that knowing how to 
perform some task consists in having the appropriate skills or abilities.  
1. Introduction
One of the central aims of epistemology has been to analyze the concept of 
knowledge. Several types data have been brought to bear on this project, including 
analyses of epistemic language (e.g., Stanley & Williamson, 2001), philosophers’ 
intuitive responses to thought experiments, and more recently, the use of psychological 
methods to investigate how non-philosophers’ conceive of knowledge (e.g., Buckwalter, 
2012). This latter methodology is often employed with an eye towards determining if, 
and to what extent, philosophers’ theories of knowledge map on to ordinary conceptions 
of knowledge. 
However, like the bulk of mainstream epistemology, those using psychological 
methods have focused primarily on the parameters that affect people’s concept of 
propositional knowledge, or knowledge-that (see Buckwalter, 2012). In contrast, people’s 
concept of knowledge-how has received comparatively little attention (Bengson, Moffett, 
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& Wright, 2009). 
There are two main camps in the debate about the constituent concepts of 
knowledge-how. One camp, intellectualism, argues that knowledge-how involves 
propositional knowledge (e.g. Bengson & Moffett, 2007; Bengson, Moffett, & Wright, 
2009; Stanley, 2011; Stanley & Williamson, 2001), whereas the competing camp argues 
that knowledge-how does not involve propositional knowledge – a view called anti-
intellectualism. According to anti-intellectualists, whereas propositional knowledge is a 
certain type of belief, knowledge-how consists in abilities, skills, or dispositions (Noë, 
2005).  
In recent years philosophers have defended intellectualism on both linguistic and 
empirical grounds. Stanley & Williamson (2001) and Stanley (2011), for instance, draw 
on Karttunen’s (1977) linguistic analysis of embedded questions to argue that sentences 
containing know-how ascriptions should be analyzed as ascriptions of propositional 
knowledge. For instance, on this view sentences of the form: 
(1) Hannah knows how to ride a bicycle. 
should be analyzed as: 
(2) Hannah knows that some way, w, is a way for her to ride a bicycle.  
Since (2) is a propositional knowledge ascription, and is allegedly the appropriate 
analysis of (1), Stanley and Williamson conclude that knowing-how requires 
propositional knowledge.1  
                                               
1 This, of course, is not a complete account of Stanley and Williamson’s position. They believe there to be 
cases in which (2) is true, but in which Hannah does not know how to ride a bicycle. In addition to (2) 
being true, in order for Hannah to know how to ride a bicycle, she must entertain the proposition in (2) 
under a practical mode of presentation. Nevertheless, we hope this brief summary makes it clear how 
Stanley and Williamson argue for the claim that propositional knowledge is necessary for knowing how.  
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Stanley and Williamson’s account of knowledge-how has proved quite influential 
in the last decade, but some philosophers have worried that their linguistic analysis does 
not accurately reflect people’s concepts. Alva Noë offers a succinct expression of this 
sort of criticism (2005). In response to Stanley and Williamson’s claim that a ski 
instructor may know how to perform ski stunts despite lacking the corresponding ability, 
Noë writes, “Is it Stanley and Williamson’s view that, if polled, most English speakers 
would share the intuition that the instructor is unable to do the jumps even though she 
knows how to do the jumps? I would predict that this is not true,” (Noë, 2005, 283).  
Recently, Bengson, Moffett, and Wright (2009) sought to test Noë’s prediction by 
examining people’s intuitions about what constitutes knowledge-how. Bengson and 
colleagues presented participants with a short story about a ski instructor who lacked the 
ability to perform the ski stunts he successfully taught to others. After reading the story, 
participants were asked whether the instructor knew how to perform ski stunts and 
whether they lacked the ability to perform them. Contrary to Noë’s prediction, Bengson 
and colleagues found that the majority of participants judged both that the ski instructor 
knows how to perform the stunts and that he does not have the ability to perform them 
himself. This result was quite surprising as traditionally many psychological theories had 
posited a distinction between knowledge-that and knowledge-how (Cohen & Squire, 
1980). 
Although Bengson and colleagues’ empirical survey provides some support for 
intellectualism, the study is subject to two potential concerns and that call for further 
empirical research. First, it does not appear that measures were taken to conceal the aim 
of the study from participants. When a study’s aim can be guessed by its participants, the 
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results may owe to demand characteristics, which are artifacts of the study design that 
lead participants to perform the study in a manner that is consistent with the experimental 
hypothesis (Firestone & Scholl, 2013; Orne, 1962; Powell et al., 2015). When demand 
characteristics cannot be ruled out, it is difficult to determine whether participants’ 
judgments provide evidence for the hypothesis in question or whether participants have 
merely guessed the aim of the study and behaved in a way consistent with their guess. 
Consequently, it is unclear whether Bengson and colleagues’ study provides evidence for 
an intellectualist concept of knowledge-how, or whether participants guessed the aim of 
the experiment and made judgments consistent with the experimenters’ hypotheses.2 This 
is not just a theoretical worry: Even in studies in which the manipulation in question is 
subtle—especially compared to the manipulations typically employed in experimental 
philosophy—participants can guess the aim of an experiment and answer in a fashion that 
is consistent with the researchers’ hypotheses (e.g., Firestone & Scholl, 2013).  
Second, as is the case in much of experimental philosophy, Bengson and 
colleagues’ study attempts to reveal people’s intuitions about knowledge-how by asking 
participants to make judgments about thought experiments. However, because people’s 
judgments are downstream from their concepts, data gathered in this manner may reflect 
unthoughtful reactions to difficult philosophical issues rather than their intuitions or 
concepts (see Cullen, 2010; Kauppinen, 2007; Powell, Horne, & Pinillos, 2014; Powell, 
Horne, Pinillos, & Holyoak, 2015; Sosa, 2007 for similar criticisms).  
In sum, these two issues signal the need for further empirical research on people’s 
                                               
2 While we think it is quite plausible that demand characteristics can explain Bengson and colleagues’ 
observed effects, we are not arguing that experimental demands do in fact explain their effect. Further 
empirical research is needed to assess this alternative hypothesis.  
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concept of knowledge-how. In the remainder of the paper, we discuss two experiments 
aimed at addressing this need.    
 
2. The Present Study 
Our aim is to reexamine how people think about knowledge-how by using a 
measure that avoids demand characteristics and more directly reflects people’s concepts.3 
Rather than using a standard survey measure, we employed an implicit measure of 
conceptual activation called semantic integration (Gentner, 1981; Powell et al., 2013; 
Powell et al., 2014; Waskan et al., 2014). Semantic integration is the cognitive process by 
which units of semantic information are combined to form more complex structured 
representations. Prior psychological research has shown that when people read sentences 
within a larger context (i.e., a passage), individual sentences are not encoded in isolation, 
but instead their meanings are concatenated to form a coherent semantic whole (e.g., 
Bransford & Franks, 1974; Gentner, 1981). Other related studies have shown that 
people's memory for semantic content tends to be more robust than their memory for the 
syntactic structure of individual sentences (e.g., Sachs, 1967). Thus, when participants 
are asked to remember a passage of text after a delay, what they remember reflects their 
semantic interpretations of the passage they read rather than the actual sentences they 
read. For example, Bransford and Franks (1971) found that reading several interrelated 
sentences (e.g., “The frog was on the log” and “The fish swam under the log”) caused 
participants to falsely recognize sentences that could be inferred from a combination of 
                                               
3 We note that while our interest in this paper is primarily psychological, we assume there is an important 
connection between the psychological and the linguistic support for intellectualist theories of knowledge-
how. This connection is illustrated by the fact that there is a clear sense in which Bengson et al.’s study was 
designed to test the descriptive accuracy of Stanley and Williamson’s linguistic analysis. 
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those two sentences (e.g., “The fish swam under the frog”). In a task that was analogous 
to the one employed by Bransford and Franks, we investigated people’s concept of 
knowledge-how by using a sentence recognition task as a measure of semantic 
integration.  
Semantic integration imposes fewer demand characteristics on participants than 
traditional survey methods because participants are led to believe they are completing a 
reading comprehension or memory task. Moreover, semantic integration tasks do not 
raise any concerns that participants’ responses are the product of unthoughtful reactions 
to philosophical thought experiments; instead the data from integration tasks reflect the 
concepts activated when participants passively encode the story they are asked to read. In 
short, unlike traditional survey measures, data from semantic integration tasks is not 
subject to the worry that it is the product of responses that are not reflective of 
participants’ concepts.  
In the present studies, we used a sentence recognition task as an implicit measure 
of semantic integration. In a 2x2 between-subjects design, participants were asked to read 
a story about a ski instructor (Experiment 1) or a chess instructor (Experiment 2).4 
Depending on the condition participants were assigned to, they would read a story in 
which the instructor has both propositional knowledge about and an ability to perform the 
task in question (KNOW-HOW), only propositional knowledge (INT) but no ability, only 
the ability (ANTI) but false beliefs about how one performs the stunts, or no ability and 
                                               
4 Ideally, we would have been able to use the same materials as Bengson et al. to test our hypotheses. 
However, semantic integration tasks preclude this possibility. If a vignette is particularly short, as Bengson 
and colleagues’ are, then it is unlikely participants will falsely remember any sentence as appearing in the 
story that did not in fact appear. This would likely lead to floor effects that would make it difficult to 
discern any condition-level differences. In light of this issue, we attempted to strike a balance between 
developing a vignette that was appropriate for a semantic integration paradigm and that included elements 
similar to those in Bengson et al.’s vignettes.   
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false beliefs about how one performs the stunts (NO KNOW-HOW). After reading a 
distractor story and answering comprehension questions about it, participants were asked 
to indicate whether a series of sentences had appeared in the story about the instructor. 
Following prior semantic integration designs (e.g., Powell et al., 2014; Powell et al., 
2015; Waskan et al., 2014), our hypothesis was that the version of the story people read 
(i.e. the condition they were assigned to) would influence what they encoded about the 
instructor.  
Predictions 
We predicted that participants would incorrectly think that a sentence had 
appeared in the story (false alarm) when the sentence fit with what they semantically 
encoded about the story. Specifically, we hypothesized that participants would incorrectly 
think that a sentence saying that an instructor knew how to perform a task (the critical 
sentence) was present in the story they read when the sentence fit with what they 
semantically encoded about the story (Bransford & Franks, 1974; Powell et al., 2014; 
Powell et al., 2015; Waskan et al., 2014). By comparing participants’ false alarm rates on 
the critical sentence across conditions, as well as their overall false alarms on other 
control sentences, we were able to measure the degree to which these stories 
differentially led participants to encode that the instructor knows how. Thus, using this 
method we are able to determine what factors – ability or propositional knowledge – lead 
participants to more frequently encode that an instructor knows-how. 
We predicted that ability, rather than propositional knowledge, would lead 
participants to encode that an instructor knew-how. In other words, we predicted a main 
effect of ability on the proportion of false alarms to the critical sentence, and no effect of 
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propositional knowledge. In addition, we predicted that there would be a greater 
proportion of false alarms on the critical sentence for the ANTI condition than for the 
INT condition.  
 
3. Experiment 1 
Participants 
Participants were 208 workers recruited on Amazon Mechanical Turk. Fifty 
percent of participants were female. The mean age of participants was 35.6 years old.  
Procedure and Materials 
Participants read one of four versions of a story about a ski instructor, Patrick, 
teaching a student how to perform ski stunts. Participants’ task was to read this story and 
remember it to the best of their ability. After reading a distractor story (a popular science 
article on gamma ray bursts) and answering comprehension questions about it, they were 
asked to judge whether a series of sentences (randomly ordered) appeared in the story 
about the ski instructor. During this sentence recognition phase, sentences were presented 
to participants in bold and they were forced to choose either, “Yes, this sentence appeared 
in the story,” or, “No, this sentence did not appear in the story.”  
In addition to presenting the critical sentence to participants, we also included 
several control sentences. One of these sentences (the teacher sentence) read, “Patrick 
was definitely a great teacher.” This was included to ensure that participants did not 
assume the ski instructor was a better teacher in virtue of having the ability to perform the 
stunts in conditions where he did indeed have this ability. It was important to include this 
sentence because a difference in how participants perceived the quality of Patrick as a 
teacher could spuriously drive a difference in false alarm rates to the critical sentence. 
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The other control sentences were included to rule out the possibility that some versions of 
the story were more difficult to remember than others.  
Results 
 Of the original 208 participants, two participants’ control sentence recognition 
scores were more than three standard deviations from the mean control sentence score. 
These participants were removed before performing subsequent analyses. However, all of 
our effects remain significant even if these participants are included in the analyses.  
 
Figure 1. The proportion of false alarm rates for the critical sentence “It was clear that 
Patrick knew how to perform ski stunts”. 
 
We predicted that we would observe a main effect of ability on false alarms for 
the critical sentence, but no effect of propositional knowledge and no interaction between 
these factors. Because our main dependent variable was dichotomous – whether you false 
alarmed to the critical sentence – we used logistic regression to examine the effect of 
ability and propositional knowledge on false alarms to the critical sentence. Consistent 

















Ability = Yes Ability = No
Proportion of False Alarms for the Critical Sentence
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critical sentence (Wald χ² (1) = 13.705, p < .001). Contrary to the intellectualist account 
of know-how, we observed no main effect of propositional knowledge on false alarms for 
the critical sentence (Wald χ² (1) = .131, p = .718), nor did we observe a significant 
interaction between these factors (Wald χ² (1) = .016, p = .90). 
Since it is possible this main effect could be driven by the KNOW-HOW 
condition, we wanted to confirm that the ANTI condition led to higher proportion of false 
alarms than the INT condition. A χ² test revealed that the ANTI condition had 
significantly more false alarms to the critical sentence than the INT condition (χ² (1, N = 
101) = 4.91, p = .026).  
Table 1. The proportion of false alarms for the Teacher and the Control sentences. 




False Alarms SE False Alarms SE 
 
Yes 
Yes .47 .067 .19 .025 
 
 
No .48 .067 .12 .018 
 
No 




 No .21 .056 .20 .021 
 
As shown in Table 1, these effects cannot be attributed to an overall difference in 
recognition performance since we observed no main effect of condition on control 
sentence performance (F(3, 204) = 2.49, p > .05), nor can it be attributed to any 
difference in participants attributing more skill to Patrick as a teacher since the ANTI 
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condition did not differ from the INT condition on false alarms for the teacher sentence 
(χ² (1, N = 101) = 2.39, p > .1).5 
 Our results indicate that, contrary to what prior empirical research on people’s 
concept of knowledge-how should lead us to expect (i.e., Bengson et al., 2009), people 
encoded that an instructor knew how when the instructor had the ability to perform the 
stunts, but false beliefs about how he performed them, compared to participants who read 
a story in which the instructor had the correct beliefs about how to perform the stunts but 
no ability to perform them.  
 
4. Experiment 2 
Participants 
Participants were 213 workers recruited on Amazon Mechanical Turk. Fifty-One 
percent of participants were female. The mean age of participants was 33.3.  
Procedure and Materials 
Experiment 2 used the same methods and analyses as experiment 1. However, 
rather than using the ski instructor story we used a story about a chess instructor. Chess 
is, intuitively, a more intellectual activity than skiing, and we wanted to test the 
possibility that people’s concept of know-how might be task-specific. In other words, one 
possibility is that people think that knowing how to do physical tasks, such as ski stunts, 
consists in having the appropriate ability, whereas they may think that knowing how to 
do more intellectual activities, such as playing chess, consists in knowing the right rules 
                                               
5 In fact, participants were more likely to encode that Patrick was a great teacher in the intellectualism 
condition than the anti-intellectualism condition, though this difference was not reliable. Moreover, 
participants’ overall control sentence score was actually better (though non-significantly) in the ANTI 
condition than the INT condition, so it is not as if participants in the ANTI condition were simply worse at 
remembering what occurred in the story than in the INT condition.  
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and strategies, that is, in having propositional knowledge. Nevertheless, if an anti-
intellectualist story still leads to a higher proportion of false alarms for the critical 
sentence in a paradigmatically intellectual activity, this would indicate that people still 
think knowledge-how is more tightly connected to having an ability than to having 
knowledge-that. Thus, in experiment 2, Patrick was a chess instructor who trained a 
student how to play chess. Everything else about the task was the same. 
Results 
Of the original 213 participants, two participants’ control sentence recognition 
scores were more than three standard deviations from the mean score. These participants 
were removed before performing any analyses. However, all of our effects (and non-
effects) remain unchanged even if we include these participants in our analyses.  
 
Figure 2: The proportion of false alarms for the critical sentence “It was clear that Patrick 
knew how to play chess”. 
 
As in experiment 1, our dependent variable was dichotomous so we again used logistic 

















Ability = Yes Ability = No
Proportion of False Alarms for the Critical Sentence
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the critical sentence. Consistent with anti-intellectualism about know-how, this analysis 
revealed a main effect of ability on false alarms for the critical sentence (Wald χ² (1) = 
12.49, p < .001). Against the intellectualist account of know-how, we observed no effect 
of having propositional knowledge about chess on false alarms for the critical sentence 
(Wald χ² (1) = .13, p = .718), nor any interaction between these factors (Wald χ² (1) = 
.708, p = .40). 
Following up on this main effect, a χ² test revealed that the ANTI condition again 
led to significantly more false alarms to the critical sentence than the INT condition  (χ² 
(1, N = 110) = 8.97, p = .002), suggesting that the main effect of ability was not solely 
driven by the KNOW HOW condition.  
Table 2.  The proportion of false alarms for the Teacher and Control sentences.  










Yes .56 .071 .20 .023 
 
 
No .58 .067 .22 .021 
 
No 




 No .14 .048 .22 .025 
 
We also found that this effect cannot be attributed to an overall difference in the 
difficulty of remembering these stories since we observed no effect of condition on 
control sentences (F (3, 207) = .227, ns), nor can it be attributed in any difference in 
participants attributing more skill to Patrick as a teacher, since there was no significant 
difference in false alarm rates for the teacher sentence comparing the ANTI and INT 
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conditions (χ² (1, N = 110) = .004, ns). 
 Contrary to the conjecture that people will have a more intellectualist conception 
of know-how in a paradigmatically intellectual domain, reading the ANTI story still led 
to more false alarms for the critical sentence than reading the INT story. Even in the case 
of chess, participants semantically encoded that the instructor knew how to play chess 
when he had the ability to play chess (and false beliefs about how he executed chess 
moves). In contrast, participants’ false alarm rates in the INT condition were not 
significantly higher than they were in the NO KNOW-HOW condition, suggesting that 
having the correct beliefs about how to perform a task does not lead people to encode that 
one knows-how.  
 
5. Discussion 
 In the last several years the question of what types of mental states are 
constitutive of knowledge-how has received a good deal of attention from 
epistemologists and philosophers of mind. Intellectualists have argued that knowing how 
to, for instance, ride a bicycle consists in having the right propositional knowledge about 
bicycle riding. Anti-intellectualists, on the other hand, have argued that knowing how to 
ride a bicycle consists in having the ability to ride a bicycle. Here, we have discussed two 
kinds of evidence for intellectualism – linguistic and psychological. The present 
empirical research, however, may call this evidence into question.  
First, our results directly contradict those of Bengson et al. (2009). Whereas 
Bengson et al. (2009) found that the majority of their participants made judgments 
consistent with intellectualism, we found that people are far more likely to semantically 
encode that an instructor knows how in cases where they have the ability to do a task, 
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despite having false beliefs about the task, than in cases where they have propositional 
knowledge about the task but lack the ability to perform it. This, in and of itself, indicates 
that there is at least equal psychological support for intellectualist and anti-intellectualist 
accounts of knowledge-how. However, our study has the additional virtue of ruling out 
alternative hypotheses and more directly reflecting participants’ concepts. In other words, 
the very structure of our task yields results that more directly reflect people’s concepts 
(e.g., Powell et al., 2014; Powell et al., 2015). In contrast, we suggest that Bengson and 
colleague’s results can be explained by appealing to demand characteristics that were not 
ruled out by the design of their study.6 
 Second, our results raise questions about the descriptive accuracy of Stanley and 
Williamson’s linguistic analysis. If their analysis were descriptively accurate, then 
participants should have had a higher proportion of false alarms to the critical sentence 
for stories in which a subject has propositional knowledge (but no ability) about a task 
than in cases where a subject has the ability (but lacks propositional knowledge) about a 
task. This, of course, is the opposite of what we found. Hence, our data puts pressure on 
the descriptive accuracy of their linguistic analysis.   
 
6. Directions for Future Research 
Above we suggested that the divergence between our results and those of 
Bengson and colleagues can be explained by the fact that their study fails to rule out the 
influence of demand characteristics, whereas ours does not. This, of course, is not the 
                                               
6 Our study also avoids the concern that participants are making judgments that reflect pragmatic factors 
downstream from their concepts (a concern Bengson himself has raised about experimental philosophy, 
Bengson, 2013).  
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only plausible explanation for this divergence. In this section, we discuss an alternative 
explanation, as well as other concerns about our results, and suggest some directions for 
future research. 
An alternative explanation of the divergence between our results and those of 
Bengson and colleagues is to appeal to the differences in the stimuli used in the studies. 
In their stimuli, Bengson and colleagues describe their protagonist as having highly 
developed and closely related abilities. For instance, in their ski instructor case, the 
instructor is described as being an accomplished skier. Our stimuli do not include 
information regarding highly developed and closely related abilities. It’s possible that in 
cases where ability is absent, the likelihood of attributing knowledge-how will vary with 
the distance between the actual case and the counterfactual case in which the subject has 
the ability (e.g., Wallis, 2008; Williams, 2007). Future research should investigate how 
these counterfactual differences affect people’s attributions of knowledge-how to a 
subject.  
Another potential worry about the interpretation of our results stems from the fact 
that in our ANTI and NO KNOW-HOW vignettes the instructor is described as having 
false beliefs about the task in question, which is compatible with his also possessing 
propositional knowledge about the task. Because of this, it is possible that our 
participants believe that the instructor still possesses propositional knowledge about the 
task in question and that this belief influences their false alarm rates on the critical 
sentence. 
 While the vignettes are compatible with this possibility, they do not weaken the 
importance of our results. If participants believed that the instructor possesses 
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propositional knowledge even when he has false beliefs about the task—and importantly, 
this influenced their false recognition rates—then there should have been some effect of 
propositional knowledge on false alarm rates for the critical sentence. However, we 
observed no trace of such an effect. Instead, it appears that whether the instructor has 
propositional knowledge or not has little effect on whether participants attributed know-
how to him. Still, further research is necessary to determine the ways in which the 
propositional knowledge a subject has can influence know-how attributions. 
7. Conclusion 
 In recent years philosophers have turned to the methods of empirical psychology 
to investigate how people think about knowledge. However, only one study, that of 
Bengson and colleagues’, has examined how non-philosophers think about knowledge-
how. This study suggests that people tend to think of know-how in an intellectualist 
manner, that is, they tend to think knowing-how involves propositional knowledge. 
 In this paper we have provided evidence for anti-intellectualism using a novel 
experimental method that avoids two concerns to which Bengson and colleagues’ study is 
subject. While our results certainly do not offer the final word on the issue, we hope to 
have advanced the empirical study of know-how and to have provided guidance for 
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Experiment 1 KNOW-HOW CONDITION (Ability-Yes, Beliefs-True)  
 
Bill arrived at the Falcon’s Nest Ski Lodge after a long, dreary day of travel. Bill had 
always been an irritable traveler, and sitting through a six-hour delay at Chicago’s 
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O’Hare airport only reinforced his foul mood. However, Bill was ready to put the stresses 
of travel behind him and settle in for the night in his suite at the lodge. 
 
When he entered his room, number 407, he was pleasantly surprised to find a welcome 
basket sitting on the counter in the kitchenette. Next to the basket was a state of the art 
hot chocolate maker. Although Bill was exhausted, and had a long day planned on the 
slopes beginning early the next morning, he couldn’t help but indulge in the room’s 
amenities before hitting the sack. Unfortunately, despite the impressive appearance of the 
hot chocolate machine, the quality of the beverage produced was disappointing. “Oh 
well,” Bill thought, “I didn’t come here to drink hot chocolate anyway.” He then went to 
bed, ready to begin his ski lesson the next morning. 
 
Bill arrived at the slopes at 8 AM the following day to meet his ski instructor, Patrick. 
Bill still couldn’t believe his luck at finding an opening in Patrick’s schedule. Patrick had 
been a ski instructor for 20 years, specializing in teaching people how to perform 
complex ski stunts. Patrick was always in high demand as an instructor, having a 
reputation of being the best in the business. 
 
While Bill had long been aware of Patrick’s teaching credentials, he learned that Patrick 
was capable of performing ski stunts himself. In fact, Patrick had competed in several 
international competitions, including the Olympics on multiple occasions. And several of 
Patrick’s former students had gone on to compete successfully in many world-class 
competitions. 
 
Patrick had developed an interest in skiing at a very early age after his family went on 
vacation to Breckenridge, Colorado. Ever since then, he spent nearly all of his free time 
both practicing ski stunts and studying the theory and technique, including some basic 
physics, of skiing. For instance, he correctly thought that the way he performs ski jumps 
was by bending his knees at the end of the ramp. After years of both study and practice, 
Patrick developed an international reputation for being among the best ski stunt 
instructors in the world. 
  
After a week of training under Patrick, Bill was amazed at how much he had learned and 
how reliable he had become at executing some of the most complex of ski stunts. Three 
weeks later, he put his new skills to the test, placing first in the Greater Mountain West 
Invitational held near Salt Lake City, Utah. “I couldn’t have done it without Patrick,” 
thought Bill. “I’ll have to send him a thank you card.” 
 
 
Experiment 1 ANTI Condition (Ability-Yes, Beliefs-False)  
 
 
 Bill arrived at the Falcon’s Nest Ski Lodge after a long, dreary day of travel. Bill had 
always been an irritable traveler, and sitting through a six-hour delay at Chicago’s 
O’Hare airport only reinforced his foul mood. However, Bill was ready to put the stresses 
of travel behind him and settle in for the night in his suite at the lodge. 
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When he entered his room, number 407, he was pleasantly surprised to find a welcome 
basket sitting on the counter in the kitchenette. Next to the basket was a state of the art 
hot chocolate maker. Although Bill was exhausted, and had a long day planned on the 
slopes beginning early the next morning, he couldn’t help but indulge in the room’s 
amenities before hitting the sack. Unfortunately, despite the impressive appearance of the 
hot chocolate machine, the quality of the beverage produced was disappointing. “Oh 
well,” Bill thought, “I didn’t come here to drink hot chocolate anyway.” He then went to 
bed, ready to begin his ski lesson the next morning. 
  
Bill arrived at the slopes at 8 AM the following day to meet his ski instructor, Patrick. 
Bill still couldn’t believe his luck at finding an opening in Patrick’s schedule. Patrick had 
been a ski instructor for 20 years, specializing in teaching people how to perform 
complex ski stunts. Patrick was always in high demand as an instructor, having a 
reputation of being the best in the business. 
  
While Bill had long been aware of Patrick’s teaching credentials, he learned that Patrick 
was capable of performing ski stunts himself. In fact, Patrick had competed in several 
international competitions, including the Olympics on multiple occasions. However, 
Patrick spent nearly all of his free time practicing skiing, and no time studying the 
science and technique behind the sport. Nevertheless, several of Patrick’s former students 
had gone on to compete successfully in various world-class competitions. 
  
Patrick had developed an interest in skiing at a very early age after his family went on 
vacation to Breckenridge, Colorado. Ever since then, he spent nearly all of his free time 
practicing ski stunts but not studying the theory and technique of skiing. For instance, he 
incorrectly thought that the way he performed ski jumps was by bending his knees at the 
end of the ramp. After years of both training and practice, Patrick developed an 
international reputation for being among the best ski stunt instructors in the world. 
  
After a week of training under Patrick, Bill was amazed at how much he had learned and 
how reliable he had become at executing some of the most complex of ski stunts. Three 
weeks later, he put his new skills to the test, placing first in the Greater Mountain West 
Invitational held near Salt Lake City, Utah. “I couldn’t have done it without Patrick,” 
thought Bill. “I’ll have to send him a thank you card.” 
 
Experiment 1 NO KNOW-HOW Condition (Ability-No, Beliefs-False)  
Bill arrived at the Falcon’s Nest Ski Lodge after a long dreary day of travel. Bill had 
always been an irritable traveler, and sitting through a six hour delay at Chicago’s 
O’Hare airport only reinforced his mood. However, Bill was ready to put the stresses of 
travel behind him, and settle in for the night in his suite at the lodge. 
 
Although Bill was exhausted, and had a long day planned on the slopes beginning early 
the next morning, he couldn’t help but indulge in the lodge’s amenities before hitting the 
sack. When he entered his room, number 407, he was pleasantly surprised to find a 
welcome basket sitting on the counter in the kitchenette. Next to the basket was a state of 
the art hot chocolate maker. Unfortunately, despite the impressive appearance of the hot 
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chocolate machine, the quality of the beverage produced was disappointing.  “Oh well,” 
he thought, “I didn’t come here to drink hot chocolate anyway.” He then went to bed, 
ready to begin his skiing the next morning. 
 
Bill arrived at the slopes at 8 AM the following day to meet his ski instructor, Patrick. 
Bill still couldn’t believe his luck at finding an opening in Patrick’s schedule. Bill had 
heard that Patrick had been a ski instructor for 20 years, specializing in teaching people 
how to perform complex ski stunts. Supposedly, Patrick was always in high demand as an 
instructor, having a reputation of being the best in the business. 
 
While Bill had heard lots of hype about Patrick’s teaching credentials, he learned that 
Patrick was incapable of performing ski stunts himself.  In fact, Patrick hadn’t even 
coached in any international competitions, and certainly not the Olympics on any 
occasion. And none of Patrick’s former students had gone on to compete successfully in 
any world-class competitions. 
 
Patrick had developed an interest in skiing at a very early age after his family went on 
vacation to Breckenridge, Colorado. Ever since then, however, he spent no time 
practicing ski stunts or studying the theory and technique of skiing. For instance, he 
incorrectly thought that the way one performs ski jumps was by bending one’s knees at 
the end of the ramp. But after years of both hype and self promotion, Patrick developed 
an international reputation for being among the best ski stunt instructors in the world. In 
reality, Patrick spent most of his time hanging out in the ski lodge flirting with women. 
  
After a week of “training” under Patrick, Bill was amazed at how little he had learned 
and how unreliable he had become at executing some of the most simple of ski stunts. 
Three weeks later, he put his new “skills” to the test, placing last in the Greater Mountain 
West Invitational held near Salt Lake City, Utah. “I couldn’t have done it without 
Patrick,” Bill bitterly thought. “I’ll have to send him a thank you card.” 
 
 
Experiment 1 INT Condition (Ability-No, Beliefs-True)  
Bill arrived at the Falcon’s Nest Ski Lodge after a long, dreary day of travel. Bill had 
always been an irritable traveler, and sitting through a six-hour delay at Chicago’s 
O’Hare airport only reinforced his foul mood. However, Bill was ready to put the stresses 
of travel behind him and settle in for the night in his suite at the lodge. 
 
When he entered his room, number 407, he was pleasantly surprised to find a welcome 
basket sitting on the counter in the kitchenette. Next to the basket was a state of the art 
hot chocolate maker. Although Bill was exhausted, and had a long day planned on the 
slopes beginning early the next morning, he couldn’t help but indulge in the room’s 
amenities before hitting the sack. Unfortunately, despite the impressive appearance of the 
hot chocolate machine, the quality of the beverage produced was disappointing. “Oh 
well,” Bill thought, “I didn’t come here to drink hot chocolate anyway.” He then went to 
bed, ready to begin his ski lesson the next morning. 
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Bill arrived at the slopes at 8 AM the following day to meet his ski instructor, Patrick. 
Bill still couldn’t believe his luck at finding an opening in Patrick’s schedule. Patrick had 
been a ski instructor for 20 years, specializing in teaching people how to perform 
complex ski stunts. Patrick was always in high demand as an instructor, having a 
reputation of being the best in the business. 
 
While Bill had long been aware of Patrick’s teaching credentials, he learned that Patrick 
was incapable of performing ski stunts himself.  Patrick had coached in several 
international competitions, including the Olympics on multiple occasions. However, 
Patrick had never had the ability to perform ski stunts himself, despite his extensive 
expertise and success at teaching others to do so. Nevertheless, several of Patrick’s 
former students had gone on to compete successfully in many world-class competitions. 
 
Patrick had developed an interest in skiing at a very early age after his family went on 
vacation to Breckenridge, Colorado. Ever since then, he spent nearly all of his free time 
both reading about ski stunts, and studying the theory and technique, including some 
basic physics, of skiing. For instance, he correctly thought that the way one performs ski 
jumps is by bending one’s knees at the end of the ramp.   After years of both study and 
research, Patrick developed an international reputation for being among the best ski stunt 
instructors in the world. 
  
After a week of training under Patrick, Bill was amazed at how much he had learned and 
how reliable he had become at executing some of the most complex of ski stunts. Three 
weeks later, he put his new skills to the test, placing first in the Greater Mountain West 
Invitational held near Salt Lake City, Utah. “I couldn’t have done it without Patrick,” 
thought Bill. “I’ll have to send him a thank you card.” 
 
Experiment 2 KNOW-HOW Condition (Ability-Yes, Beliefs-True) 
Bill arrived at the Midwestern Chess Academy after a long, dreary day of travel. Bill had 
always been an irritable traveler, and sitting through a six-hour delay at Chicago’s 
O’Hare airport only reinforced his foul mood. However, Bill was ready to put the stresses 
of travel behind him and settle in for the night in his hotel room. 
 
           When he entered his room, number 407, he was pleasantly surprised to find a 
welcome basket sitting on the counter in the kitchenette. Next to the basket was a state of 
the art hot chocolate maker. Although Bill was exhausted, and had a long day of chess 
beginning early the next morning, he couldn’t help but indulge in the room’s amenities 
before hitting the sack. Unfortunately, despite the impressive appearance of the hot 
chocolate machine, the quality of the beverage produced was disappointing. “Oh well,” 
Bill thought, “I didn’t come here to drink hot chocolate anyway.” He then went to bed, 
ready to begin his chess lesson the next morning. 
 
           Bill arrived at the lesson at 8 AM the following day to meet his chess instructor, 
Patrick. Bill still couldn’t believe his luck at finding an opening in Patrick’s schedule. 
Patrick had been a chess instructor for 20 years, specializing in teaching people opening 
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strategies. Patrick was always in high demand as an instructor, having a reputation for 
being the best in the business. 
 
           While Bill had long been aware of Patrick’s teaching credentials, he learned that 
Patrick excelled at playing chess as well. In fact, Patrick had competed in several 
international competitions, including the World Championship on multiple occasions. 
And several of Patrick’s former students had gone on to compete successfully in many 
world-class competitions. 
 
           Patrick had developed an interest in chess at a very early age after his family took 
a trip to the National Chess Hall of Fame. Ever since then, he spent nearly all of his free 
time both practicing chess and studying the theory and technique, including some basic 
game theory, of chess. For instance, he correctly thought he won matches by controlling 
the center of the board. After years of both study and practice, Patrick developed an 
international reputation for being among the best chess instructors in the world. 
 
           After a week of training under Patrick, Bill was amazed at how much he had 
learned and how intuitive executing the most complex of chess openings became. Three 
weeks later, he put his new skills to the test, placing first in the Greater Midwest Chess 
Tournament held near Milwaukee, Wisconsin. “I couldn’t have done it without Patrick,” 
thought Bill. “I’ll have to send him a thank you card. 
 
Experiment 2 ANTI Condition (Ability-Yes, Beliefs-False)  
 
Bill arrived at the Midwestern Chess Academy after a long, dreary day of travel. Bill had 
always been an irritable traveler, and sitting through a six-hour delay at Chicago’s 
O’Hare airport only reinforced his foul mood. However, Bill was ready to put the stresses 
of travel behind him and settle in for the night in his hotel room. 
 
            When he entered his room, number 407, he was pleasantly surprised to find a 
welcome basket sitting on the counter in the kitchenette. Next to the basket was a state of 
the art hot chocolate maker. Although Bill was exhausted, and had a long day of chess 
beginning early the next morning, he couldn’t help but indulge in the room’s amenities 
before hitting the sack. Unfortunately, despite the impressive appearance of the hot 
chocolate machine, the quality of the beverage produced was disappointing. “Oh well,” 
Bill thought, “I didn’t come here to drink hot chocolate anyway.” He then went to bed, 
ready to begin his chess lesson the next morning. 
 
            Bill arrived at the lesson at 8 AM the following day to meet his chess instructor, 
Patrick. Bill still couldn’t believe his luck at finding an opening in Patrick’s schedule. 
Patrick had been a chess instructor for 20 years, specializing in teaching people opening 
strategies. Patrick was always in high demand as an instructor, having a reputation for 
being the best in the business. 
 
            While Bill had long been aware of Patrick’s teaching credentials, he learned that 
Patrick excelled at playing chess as well. In fact, Patrick had competed in several 
 25 
international competitions, including the World Championship on multiple occasions. 
However, Patrick spent nearly all of his free time practicing chess, and no time studying 
the theory and technique behind the game. Nevertheless, several of Patrick’s former 
students had gone on to compete successfully in many world-class competitions. 
 
            Patrick had developed an interest in chess at a very early age after his family took 
a trip to the National Chess Hall of Fame. Ever since then, he spent nearly all of his free 
time practicing chess and no time reading about chess or studying the theory and 
technique of chess. For instance, he thought he won matches by controlling the center of 
the board, but in fact he won by successfully isolating his opponent’s strongest pieces. 
After years of both training and practice, Patrick developed an international reputation for 
being among the best chess instructors in the world. 
 
       After a week of training under Patrick, Bill was amazed at how much he had learned 
and how intuitive executing the most complex of chess openings became. Three weeks 
later, he put his new skills to the test, placing first in the Greater Midwest Chess 
Tournament held near Milwaukee, Wisconsin. “I couldn’t have done it without Patrick,” 
thought Bill. “I’ll have to send him a thank you card. 
  
Experiment 2 NO KNOW-HOW (Ability-No, Beliefs-False) 
 
Bill arrived at the Midwestern Chess Academy after a long, dreary day of travel. Bill had 
always been an irritable traveler, and sitting through a six-hour delay at Chicago’s 
O’Hare airport only reinforced his foul mood. However, Bill was ready to put the stresses 
of travel behind him and settle in for the night in his hotel room. 
 
           When he entered his room, number 407, he was pleasantly surprised to find a 
welcome basket sitting on the counter in the kitchenette. Next to the basket was a state of 
the art hot chocolate maker. Although Bill was exhausted, and had a long day of chess 
beginning early the next morning, he couldn’t help but indulge in the room’s amenities 
before hitting the sack. Unfortunately, despite the impressive appearance of the hot 
chocolate machine, the quality of the beverage produced was disappointing. “Oh well,” 
Bill thought, “I didn’t come here to drink hot chocolate anyway.” He then went to bed, 
ready to begin his chess lesson the next morning. 
 
           Bill arrived at the lesson at 8 AM the following day to meet his chess instructor, 
Patrick. Bill still couldn’t believe his luck at finding an opening in Patrick’s 
schedule. Bill had heard that Patrick had been a chess instructor for 20 years, specializing 
in teaching people opening strategies. Supposedly, Patrick was always in high demand as 
an instructor, having a reputation for being the best in the business. 
 
           While Bill had heard lots of hype about Patrick’s teaching credentials, he learned 
that Patrick was quite poor at playing. In fact, Patrick hadn’t even coached in any 
international competitions, and certainly not the World Championship on any occasions. 
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And none of Patrick’s former students had gone on to compete successfully in any world-
class competitions. 
 
           Patrick had developed an interest in chess at a very early age after his family took 
a trip to the National Chess Hall of Fame. But ever since then, he spent no time practicing 
chess or studying the theory and technique of chess. But after years of both hype and self 
promotion, Patrick developed an international reputation for being among the best chess 
instructors in the world. In reality, Patrick spent most of his time hanging out in singles 
bars flirting with women. 
 
           After a week of “training” under Patrick, Bill was amazed at how little he had 
learned and how difficult it was for him to execute the most simple chess openings. Three 
weeks later, he put his new “skills” to the test, placing last in the Greater Midwest Chess 
Tournament held near Milwaukee, Wisconsin. “I couldn’t have done it without Patrick,” 
Bill bitterly thought. “I’ll have to send him a thank you card.” 
  
  
Experiment 2 INT Condition (Ability-No, Beliefs-True)  
 
Bill arrived at the Midwestern Chess Academy after a long, dreary day of travel. Bill had 
always been an irritable traveler, and sitting through a six-hour delay at Chicago’s 
O’Hare airport only reinforced his foul mood. However, Bill was ready to put the stresses 
of travel behind him and settle in for the night in his hotel room. 
 
            When he entered his room, number 407, he was pleasantly surprised to find a 
welcome basket sitting on the counter in the kitchenette. Next to the basket was a state of 
the art hot chocolate maker. Although Bill was exhausted, and had a long day of chess 
beginning early the next morning, he couldn’t help but indulge in the room’s amenities 
before hitting the sack. Unfortunately, despite the impressive appearance of the hot 
chocolate machine, the quality of the beverage produced was disappointing. “Oh well,” 
Bill thought, “I didn’t come here to drink hot chocolate anyway.” He then went to bed, 
ready to begin his chess lesson the next morning. 
 
            Bill arrived at the lesson at 8 AM the following day to meet his chess instructor, 
Patrick. Bill still couldn’t believe his luck at finding an opening in Patrick’s schedule. 
Patrick had been a chess instructor for 20 years, specializing in teaching people opening 
strategies. Patrick was always in high demand as an instructor, having a reputation for 
being the best in the business. 
 
            While Bill had long been aware of Patrick’s teaching credentials, he learned that 
Patrick was quite poor at playing. Patrick had coached in several international 
competitions, including the World Championship on multiple occasions. But while 
Patrick was excellent at analyzing the state of the chessboard, he was atrocious at 
anticipating and planning moves under time constraints. Nevertheless, several of 




            Patrick had developed an interest in chess at a very early age after his family took 
a trip to the National Chess Hall of Fame. Ever since then, he spent nearly all of his free 
time reading about chess and studying the theory and technique, including some basic 
game theory, of chess.  For instance, he correctly thought that one way to win matches is 
by controlling the center of the board. After years of both study and research, Patrick 
developed an international reputation for being among the best chess instructors in the 
world. 
 
            After a week of training under Patrick, Bill was amazed at how much he had 
learned and how intuitive executing the most complex of chess openings became. Three 
weeks later, he put his new skills to the test, placing first in the Greater Midwest Chess 
Tournament held near Milwaukee, Wisconsin. “I couldn’t have done it without Patrick,” 




















We have enclosed the revised manuscript, “Evidence for anti-intellectualism about know-how 
from a sentence recognition task” (ms. SYNT-D-15-00050; invited resubmission). We are 
grateful for the helpful comments from both reviewers. As detailed in this letter, we have 
attempted to address all of the concerns raised by the reviewers about the first version of this 





1. Reviewer 1 raises the important point that although demand characteristics can 
confound a study, we do not point to specific demands in Bengson and colleagues’ 
experiments. Consequently, the charge that their findings are likely the product of demand 
characteristics is rather nebulous. Indeed, Bengson and colleagues appear to have found 
quite strong effects so if their results owed to the demands of the experiment that would 
seem surprising.  
 
We thank the reviewer for making this important point. There are several reasons that we think 
demand characteristics can explain Bengson and colleagues’ findings which we discuss below.  
 
First, we suspect that demands can explain the observed effect because the effects are probably 
only “strongly yes” because the data was transformed prior to be analyzed. In footnote 14 of the 
Bengson et al., say 
 
“For both questions in this study, as well as the studies that follow, participants were 
given the following options: ‘‘definitely yes’’; ‘‘probably yes’’; ‘‘probably not’’; 
‘‘definitely not’’. These answers were collapsed into a dichotomous variable (1 = yes; 0 = 
no) for statistical analysis.”  
 
Presumably, the authors transformed the data because there is no meaningful statistical analysis 
you can perform on an ordinal scale rating when you have nothing to compare it to. (We note 
that comparing to the midpoint on an ordinal scale is a meaningless analysis despite the 
frequency with which we see this analysis employed). We think it’s possible that the demands of 
the experiment weakly biased participants towards being on the “yes” side of the scale without 
actually pushing them towards the extreme end of that side of the scale. Since “probably yes” 
responses were coded as “yes” responses, this would exaggerate the reported effect.  In this way, 
the effect size could appear larger than it actually is.   
 
Second, even though demand characteristics can be quite subtle, it has since been found that 
several striking effects in social psychology that researchers initially thought owed to a subtle 
experimental manipulation are more likely due to the demands placed on participants by the 
manipulation. For example, consider one study purporting to demonstrate that people who think 
Response to reviewers' comments
about unethical (rather than ethical) actions will literally see the world as though it is darker 
(Banerjee, Chatterjee, & Sinha, 2012). This experiment proceeded as follows: Participants first 
thought about an unethical or ethical action they had previously performed. After reflecting on 
this action, participants were asked to rate how bright the room they were in was using a Likert 
scale. In line with the “darkness” hypothesis, participants in the unethical condition rated the 
room they were in as less bright than participants that thought about an ethical action. However, 
Firestone and Scholl (2013) demonstrated that this effect owes to the demands of the experiment 
rather than how participants literally perceive the world. They uncovered this by showing a 
similar effect in a condition in which it made no sense for the effect to obtain (page p. 40 - 42). 
Thus, even in a study with a manipulation that is quite subtle compared to the typical 
manipulations in experimental philosophy, participants guessed the aim of the experiment and 
answered in a fashion that was consistent with the researchers hypotheses.  
 
 Finally, we point out that observational studies do not have random assignment of a participant 
to a condition. Bengson and colleagues’ study is an observational study because there is no 
manipulation (though this does not mean there are no demands). Consequently, any bias 
introduced by the design of the study, such as only asking a few questions related to your 
hypothesis, are more likely to affect the results because the biases are not “removed” by the 
random assignment of a participant to a control or experimental condition. This isn’t always a 
problem but it is more of a cause for concern if participants can plausibly guess the aim of the 
study. And we think it is quite likely that participants could guess the aim of Bengson and 
colleagues’ study.  
 
In sum, we think these points suggest that demand characteristics can explain Bengson and 
colleagues’ effects. However, since we have not explicitly tested the exact demand present in 
their study, we have tempered our claims in the paper in order to raise the possibility without 
arguing for the stronger hypothesis that demands do explain their observed effect.  
 
2. Reviewer 1 wondered why we did not use Bengson and colleagues experimental materials 
in our semantic integration study.  
 
Although it would be ideal if we could perform a semantic integration experiment with their 
materials, it’s not possible because of the length of their vignettes. If a vignette is particularly 
short, as their vignettes are, then it is easy for participants to remember all the sentences that 
appeared in the vignette. Thus, false recognition for sentences that never appeared in the story 
would be near floor, no matter what condition the participant was assigned to. For this reason, 
we attempted to strike a balance between developing a vignette that was fit for the semantic 
integration paradigm and one that included elements similar to those present in their vignettes. 
 
We thank Reviewer 1 for pointing this out and we have now included a footnote to explain why 
we created new stimuli instead of simply using their vignettes.  
 
3. Reviewer 1 makes the important point that their experimental materials and our 
experimental materials differ in the closeness of the counterfactual cases subjects may 
think about when considering whether the person in the vignette knows-how to perform a 
stunt.  
 
We thank the reviewer for raising this alternative hypothesis. We now discuss this point in the 
general discussion of results at the end of the paper.  
 
4. Reviewer 1 wonders why we used a sentence recognition task rather than a single-word 
recall task.  
 
Since “knows how” is two words, we realized that there was no clean way to do a single-word 
recall task, nor is it clear compositionally what simpler words could stand in for “knows how” as 
lures (as is the case for “thought” and “knows” in prior tasks; Powell et al., 2015). Consequently, 
we used a sentence recognition task to get around this issue since prior work suggests that these 
recognition tasks operate on similar psychological principles as the single word replacement 
tasks, especially when other control sentences are included to disambiguate the results (see 




1. Reviewer 2 was concerned that there is a disanalogy between our “no propositional 
knowledge condition” and our “no abilities” condition. The details provided in the “no 
propositional knowledge condition” are compatible with the subject having propositional 
knowledge about the activity in question. The reviewer argues that this disanalogy weakens 
the significance of our results and asks us to discuss this concern.  
 
While we agree that the details of our no propositional knowledge condition are compatible with 
the teacher possessing propositional knowledge about the task in question -- and now we have 
discussed this issue in the discussion section of our paper-- we do not believe that this weakens 
the significance of our results.  
 
We take it that this worry is motivated by the possibility that our participants believe that in the 
NO PROP KNOWLEDGE condition the subject still possesses propositional knowledge and this 
influence participants’ false alarm rates on the critical sentence. However, if this were the case 
we should have seen a main effect of propositional knowledge on false alarm rates for the critical 
sentence, which we did not. Instead, it appears that whether the instructor has propositional 
knowledge or not has little effect on whether people attribute know-how to the teacher. 
 
2. Reviewer 2 suggested that a true analogue of the no abilities condition would be a case in 
which it was said that the the subject “knows no facts” about the activity in question.  
 
We find this suggestion helpful, though we believe it would be difficult to implement 
experimentally. The expression, “knows no facts about X-ing,” is a somewhat unnatural 
sounding expression, and we worry that this unnaturalness would confound the results of any 
sentence recognition task. We might instead say “knows nothing about X-ing.” However, we 
believe that it would be difficult to tell a plausible sounding story that includes a phrase of this 
sort. First, it is not clear whether such a phrase rules out only knowledge of facts, or other types 
of knowledge as well. Second, even if propositional knowledge is necessary for, or otherwise 
implicated in knowing how, we think it is quite plausible that one can have propositional 
knowledge about some task without having the propositional knowledge that’s relevant to 
knowing how. Most people who don’t know how to do ski stunts still know some facts about it 
(e.g., that it involves snow).  
 
3. Reviewer 2 suggests a study that includes two critical sentences, “It was clear that 
Patrick knew how to perform ski stunts,” and “It was clear that Patrick knew facts about 
performing ski stunts.” The reviewer believes this study would be more philosophically 
informative and yield more robust consequences for the debate over intellectualism. We 
are asked to explain how we view the prospects of such experiments.  
 
We thank Reviewer 2 for this helpful suggestion. We think in future work it would be worth 
investigating (in a between-subjects design) differential activation of a sentence like “It was clear 
that Patrick knew a lot about ski stunts” and our critical sentence “It was clear that Patrick knew 
how to perform ski stunts” using the vignettes we developed in this paper.  
 
 
4. Reviewer 2 raises the issue of of whether the critical sentence could contain a negation to 
provide more compelling evidence for anti-intellectualism about know-how. That is, in 
addition to using a critical sentence like “Patrick knew how to perform ski stunts,” the 
suggestion would be to include a sentence like, “Patrick did not know how to perform ski 
stunts.”  
 
We think this is a great suggestion. However, future work that included a negation in the critical 
sentence would need to be careful of the well-known difficulties associated with people’s 
processing and memory for negations (e.g., Lewandowsky et al., 2012).  
 
Reviewer 2 Minor Points 
 
p. 1-2: It is misleading to quote Bengson and colleague(s) as proponents of intellectualism, 
if the latter is the view “that knowledge-how is a species of, or reducible to, propositional 
knowledge. They are intellectualists, but in another sense.  
 
We thank the reviewer for their helpful comment. We agree that it is misleading to characterize 
Bengson et al. as proponents of intellectualism as we define the view at the outset of the paper. 
We have altered the characterization of intellectualism to address this point.  
 
p.3 Fn. 1: Some have argued that practical modes of presentation bring ability back in (e.g. 
Glick 2013 and the literature quoted there). So there is a slight complication with this 
footnote. 
 
Footnote 1 has been revised to avoid raising this complication.   
 
pp.3-5: It is overly complicated to first explain the result of the Bengson et al. study and 
then take so much time to re-introduce the need for such a study with reference to the Noe 
paper.  
 
We have revised the structure of pages 3-5 in order to simplify our discussion of their results.  
 
pp.5-6: What is the justification for the claim that, in the study, the aim was revealed to 
participants?  
 
We have addressed this concern in our response to Reviewer 1 above.  
 
 
p.6: What is the difference between the first component of the second problem and the first 
problem? Aren’t they simply the same? If not, why?  
 
We agree that these are indeed the same problem. We have revised this portion of the paper to 
reflect this. We thank reviewer 2 for this helpful point.  
 
p. 12: The last sentence is misleading since the Bengson et al. study does not deal in false 
alarm rates.  
 
We have revised this sentence to address this problem. We have corrected the noted types.  
 
We hope that the expanded and revised manuscript warrants publication in Synthese. We thank 
the reviewers again for their enormously helpful comments, and we look forward to hearing from 
you soon. 
  
 
 
  
 
